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GAUDETTE V WEBB. NONSTATUTORY
WRONGFUL DEATH IN
MASSACHUSETTS
In Gaudette v Webb,1 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts ruled "that the law m this Commonwealth has evolved to
the point where it may now be held that the right to recovery for wrong-
ful death is of common law origin "2 This landmark decision
makes it possible for a suitor, who suffers damages due to the wrongful
death of a third person, to institute a cause of action without relying
on the state's wrongful death statute3 as the source of the right.4 As
such the Gaudette holding is a recognition by the Massachusetts court of
the cogent criticism by tribunals and commentators of the common
law rule that denied any right to recovery for wrongful death.5 It is
also an example of judicial lawmaking where the court's action is mo-
tivated as much by a desire to embellish a previously existing statutory
scheme as to change the outmoded common law 6 While discontented
with the restrictive maxim of the common law, courts had previously
felt it was too firmly established to be any longer open to question.7
1. - Mass. - 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972).
2. Id. at - 284 N.E.2d at 229.
3. MASS. GEN. Lws ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1973).
4. The general rule, which Massachusetts has departed from under Gaudette v.
Webb, is that when an action is brought under a wrongful death statute the party must
look to that statute as providing both the remedy and the right. Bickford v. Furber,
271 Mass. 94, 97, 170 N.E. 746, 798 (1930).
5. E.g., Rowe v. Richards, 35 S.D. 201, 206-07, 151 N.W 1001, 1003 (1915);
Osborn v. Gillett, L.R. 8 Ex. 88, 95-99 (1873) (dissenting opimon); Monaghan v.
Horn, 7 Can. S. Ct. 409, 433 (1882) (dissenting opinion). The dissenting opinions
in the Osborn and Monaghan cases express the most noted and vigorous criticism of
the common law rule. 3 W HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 333-36 (3d ed.
1923) [hereinafter cited as HoLDSwoRTH]; Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in
Baker v. Bolton, 32 LAw QUAITERLY REviEw 431 (1916).
6. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARvAiD LEGAL ESSAYS 213,
233 (1934): 'The consciousness that the judicial and legislative processes are
closely allied both in technique and in aims will inevitably make for greater inter-
dependence m both. The beginnings of such a movement are already clearly discern-
ible in the process of statutory interpretation where courts, returning to an earlier
attitude, seek to interpret expressions of policy in the light of the manifold circum-
stances responsible for the statutory formulation."
7. E.g., Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 756-57 (1877): "The authorities
are so numerous and so uniform to the proposition, that by the common law no
[1067]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Nevertheless, under the circumstances in Gaudette, the Massachusetts
high court was persuaded to depart from the doctrine of stare decisis
and introduce an innovation to the common law.
Exactly why the court found the circumstances in Gaudette com-
pelling enough to recognize a new common law right is more readily
apparent in view of the history of actions for wrongful death prior to
the decision. The past manifests the need for the change which the
Massachusetts judiciary has introduced and underscores the import of
this case as the potential catalyst for similar judicial innovation in other
jurisdictions.
Common Law Background
The common law rule, which the instant case abrogated, held that
there was no recovery allowable in a civil suit for the wrongful death
of a person. This rule was first applied in the case of Baker v. Bol-
ton," decided by Lord Ellenborough in 1808, wherein he pronounced:
"In a civil Court, the death of a human being could not be complained
of as an injury. . . ."I Although the rule was made without citing any
authority or displaying any historical or technical basis for its adop-
tion," it was accepted as a correct statement of the law. From this
beginning, Lord Ellenborough's ruling operated to shield a tortfeasor
from liability in a suit brought by a party who had a personal interest
in the continued life of someone killed as a result of the tortfeasor's
conduct. Thus, in its harshest application, this principle functioned
to bar any action for damages by the surviving spouse or child for
losses sustained because of the victim's death. Their loss of monetary
support, of love and affection, guidance and comfort were all non-
compensable. Other persons, such as those with a contractual right
to the deceased's services or his creditors, were also left bereft of any
remedy to recoup their losses. 1
civil action lies for an injury which results in death, that it is impossible to speak of
it as a proposition open to question. It has been decided in many cases in the English
courts and in many of the State courts, and no deliberate, well-considered decision to
the contrary is to be found."; Lucier v. Hittleman, 125 Conn. 635, 636, 7 A.2d 647
(1939): "[W]hatever the reasons upon which it has been said to rest, the rule has
become thoroughly embedded in the common law."; Bates v. Sylvester, 205 Mo. 493,
499, 104 S.W. 73, 74 (1907); Duncan v. Saint Luke's Hosp., 113 App. Div. 68, 73,
98 N.Y.S. 867, 871 (1906).
8. 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
9. Id. The wife of the plaintiff had been killed due to injuries sustained when
the defendant's stagecoach, on which she and her husband were passengers, overturned
by reason of the driver's presumed negligence.
10. Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 LAW QUARTERLY
REViEW 431 (1916).
11. Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND.
L. REV. 605, 620 (1960).
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One might rightfully assume that such a restrictive rule as the
Baker v. Bolton proposition would have some deep-rooted policy
grounds by which it is justified. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned,
Lord Ellenborough's opinion set forth no basis for the doctrine he an-
nounced. Because of this, exhaustive commentaries have been written
by legal scholars speculating as to the basis of the doctrine.12  The gen-
eral conclusion of historians, which is acknowledged in the Gaudette
opinion,13 is that Lord Ellenborough's holding in Baker v. Bolton was
based on a misconception of either the "felony-merger" doctrine or the
maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona-a personal right of action
dies with the person.14
The English case of Higgins v. Butcher,'5 decided 200 years be-
fore Baker, first expressed the doctrine of felony-merger. 16 It was ap-
plied to deny. a civil action to a party who suffered personal damages
as the result of a killing of a third person under circumstances amount-
ing to a felony.' 7  The reason for the rule was that a felony, being an
12. E.g., Craig, Damages Recoverable for Wrongful Death, 5 U. RicH. L. REV.
213 (1971); Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 LAw QUARTERLY
REVIEW 431 (1916); Malone, The Genesis Of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043
(1965); Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L.
REv. 605 (1960); Voss, The Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Death at Common
Law, at Civil Law, and in Louisiana, 6 TuL. L. REv. 201 (1932).
13. "There are some suggestions that the decision in Baker v. Bolton is founded
upon the 'felony-merger' doctrine, and others that its basis lies in the principles gov-
erning survival of actions at common law." - Mass. at -, 284 N.E.2d at 228.
14. "[r]he judge could have stated his ruling incautiously so that it declared
absolutely that no action for damages could arise from the death of a person. This
overstatement may have resulted either from confusion concerning the affect of the
maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona or from unwarranted assumptions re-
garding the merger doctrine." Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law
Rules, 13 VANID. L. REv. 605, 615 (1960). In Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in
Baker v. Bolton, 32 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 431, 434 (1916), the author suggests as
an explanation for the doctrine "that the rule based upon the maxim actio personalis &
c., became confused with the rule based upon the fact that the tortious act was a fel-
ony ....
15. 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (KB. 1607).
16. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 5, at 331.
17. In Higgins v. Butcher the defendant beat the plaintiff's wife inflicting serious
injury so that she died the next day. The husband sought damages for the loss of his
wife's services. But the court found for the defendant saying, "if a man beats the
servant of J. S. so that he dies of that battery, the master shall not have an action
against the other for the battery and loss of the service, because the servant dying of
the extremity of the battery, it is now become an offence to the Crown, being con-
verted into felony, and that drowns the particular offence, and private wrong offer'd to
the master before, and his action is thereby lost.. . ." 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1607).
Seventy years later, in the case of Smith v. Sykes, 89 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B. 1677),
the felony-merger principle was stated thus: "[I]f A, beat the wife of B., so that she
dies, B. can have no action of the case for that; because it is criminal, and of a
higher nature."
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offense against the Crown, was punishable by execution of the offender
and forfeiture of all his property to the sovereign.' 8 After this there
was nothing left against which the party could pursue a remedy. The
tort effectively merged into the felony. This felony-merger doctrine,
however, clearly was not applicable to the facts in Baker. In that case
the wife was killed due to the negligence of a stagecoach driver. Hence
there was no felony under which the merger doctrine could operate
to extinguish the plaintiffs wrongful death action. 19  Lord Ellenbor-
ough made no finding in the case that the act of the defendant was a
felony or that the felony-merger doctrine was effective to "drown" the
civil suit.20 His failure to do so has raised the belief the decision
was reached through a misapplication of the merger doctrine.
The maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona21 was likewise
inappropriate to the Baker case. It functioned to protect a wrongdoer
from liability by denying a cause of action to the personal representa-
tive of the deceased. The representative could not sue on the deceased's
behalf for damages which the latter sustained before dying, nor for
any damages to his estate as a consequence of his death. If either
party to the action died, then the action itself died. Nevertheless, in
Baker both parties were alive. The parties were the husband and the
stagecoach company. The deceased wife was not a party to the suit
although her death gave rise to the action. The husband was suing
for his own personal damages caused by the wife's death and his re-
sultant loss of her services. Yet, because Baker v. Bolton was only a
nisi prius case and apparently only briefly argued, authorities theorize
that Lord Ellenborough may have thought the plaintiff was seeking
damages for the victim's own losses, or that he did not perceive the
wholly distinct nature of an action by the husband for his own per-
18. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 10 (2d ed. 1969).
19. This point was made by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475, 477-78 (1848): "But whatever may
be the meaning or legal effect of the maxim, that a trespass is merged in a felony, it
has no application to the cases now before us. In neither of them was the killing
felonious, and there is, therefore, no felony, in which a private injury can merge."
20. It is possible that when Baker v. Bolton was decided the felony merger doc-
trine operated only to suspend rather than extinguish the civil action. "[I1t was
uttered at a time when there was very considerable doubt whether the fact that a civil
wrong was also a felony destroyed or only suspended the right of action in tort."
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 335. The history of this modification began with a
series of cases in the first quarter of the seventeenth century which adopted the posi-
tion that a felony only stayed the civil cause of action until the criminal prosecution
was completed. Id. at 332-333. See, e.g., Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349, 353 (1854);
Green v. Hudson River R.R., 28 Barb. 9, 17 (N.Y. 1858); Smith v. Selwyn, [1914]
3 K.B. 98, 99; Wells v. Abrahams L.R. 7 Q.B. 554, 557 (1872).




sonal damages and therefore held the action barred under the principal
actio personalis moritur cum persona.
2
2
The Application of Baker v. Bolton in the United States
Thus the rule existed without any technical or historical grounds
that were sufficient to justify it. Despite this, courts dutifully enforced
Lord Ellenborough's holding, but the opinions often manifested the
judges' unhappiness with the rule and their misgivings regarding its ac-
curacy.2" Reluctant to overrule Baker v. Bolton, some American judges
reached for social, moral and practical rationales with which to justify
their refusal to recognize any cause of action for wrongful death. One
such rationalization was that to permit the value of human life to be-
come the subject of judicial computation was repugnant to the policy
of the law.24  Other American courts held it was proper to deny re-
covery in wrongful death cases on the principle that the life of a free-
man cannot be evaluated in terms of money.25 Whether or not these
judicial rationalizations were sound justifications for denying a cause
of action for death by wrongful act, their effect in combination with
the historical and technical bases for the rule were sufficient to cause its
begrudging acceptance in England and America until the middle
1800's. Eventually, mounting social pressure moved legislatures to
modify or abrogate the rule through statutory enactments.
The increased pressure for statutory reform was largely attributable
to the sharp rise in accidental deaths during the initial years of the
22. See notes 12, 14 supra.
23. See, e.g., Osborn v. Gillett, L.R. 8 Ex. 88, 96 (1873), where Judge Bramwell
spoke in a vigorous dissent saying he was "by no means sure of [the rule's] accuracy"
and further pointed out that "no argument is stated, no authority cited, and I cannot
set a high value on that case . . . ."; in Rose v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826, 834, Lord
Atkin criticized the decision in Admiralty Commissioners v. S. S. Amerika, [1917]
A.C. 38, which had confirmed the rule of Baker v. Bolton, stating- "I see no reason
for extending the illogical doctrine of The Amerika (I) to any case where it does not
clearly apply. As to the supposed foundation of the doctrine in the law relating to
felony I will only say that if the rule is really based on the relevant death being due
to felony, it should long ago have been relegated to a museum
24. E.g., Philby v. Northern Pac. Ry., 46 Wash. 173, 178, 89 P. 468, 470 (1907):
"'When it is said that the death of a human being cannot be made the subject of
damages in a civil action, we must infer that to allow the remedy in such a case would
be inconsistent with the policy of the law that will not permit the value of human life
to become the subject of judicial computation."' The notion of a moral aversion to
wrongful death actions was stated in Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 191 (1867):
"To the cultivated and enlightened mind, looking at human life in. the light of the
Christian religion as sacred, the idea of compensating its loss in money is revolt-
ing. .. ."
25. E.g., King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505, 509 (1886): "[I]n the eye of the com-
mon law 'the value of life was so great as to be incapable of being estimated by
money."' Lucier v. Hittleman, 125 Conn. 635, 638, 7 A.2d 647, 648 (1939).
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industrial and transportational revolutions. 26  Whereas before unnat-
ural death was largely the result of a violent or criminal act, such
deaths frequently were caused by the negligence of a corporate defen-
dant involved in some institutional enterprise.2 7  Legislatures sensed the
reprehensibleness of allowing the tortious infliction of fatal injuries
by a prosperous corporate defendant to go unredressed, leaving an
impecunious widow and children without remedy for the losses they
were forced to suffer. An urgent motive for statutory abrogation of the
Baker v. Bolton rule was apparent. There being no logical rationale
for perpetuating a common law system containing such manifest injus-
tices, legislation was introduced2 s to create a new cause of action upon
the death of a third person in favor of his survivors.29
26. The court in Rowe v. Richards, 35 S.D. 201, 151 N.W. 1001 (1915), noted
this fact when inquiring into the conditions that gave rise to wrongful death statutes.
"With the evolution of modem industry, resulting as it did in frequent deaths from
negligence, the injustice of the rule of the common law became impressed upon the
leaders of thought .. " Id. at 206-07, 151 N.W. at 1003.
27. In discussing the new wrongful death statutes that were being enacted in
England and in many of the states, Justice Christiancy, in Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich.
180, 191 (1867), spoke of the "necessity which has grown out of the new modes of
travel and business in modem times, by which great numbers are compelled to trust
their lives to the skill and vigilance of the servants of corporations, and others in simi-
lar positions of responsibility-a state of things which seemed to call for a remedy
which should make railroad corporations, steamboat managers, and parties to whom
others are compelled to trust for safety, more sensible of their responsibilities, and
more careful to secure a high degree of vigilance in protecting the lives intrusted to
their care, and at the same time afford relief for cases of great individual hardship,
which might otherwise be suffered by those dependent upon the person whose life may
be lost."
"The significance of the accident experiences of the early railroads in bringing
about survival and wrongful death legislation in the American states is indicated by
the fact that nearly all the early cases brought under this legislation were to recover
damages for deaths caused by the negligent operation of trains." Smedley, Wrongful
Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REv. 605, 624, n.90 (1960).
28. The first wrongful death statute to be enacted in the United States appears
to have been in New York in 1847. Laws of New York 1847, vol. 2, C. 450, p. 575.
Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 F. 92, 94 (2d Cir. 1921); Western Union Tel. Co. v. McGill,
57 F. 699, 700 (8th Cir. 1893). Thereafter, statutes providing a remedy in one form
or another for wrongful death were widely adopted. See notes 76, 77 and accompany-
ing text infra.
29. Statutes providing relief in derogation of the common law fall into two
groups, the wrongful death statute and the survival statute. The former provides a
new cause of action for the benefit of designated survivors. Damages recoverable are
normally those they personally incurred through the deprivation of support that would
have been received from the deceased had he lived. The latter type of statute abol-
ishes the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona (see note 21 and accompanying
text supra) by continuing in the deceased's personal representative any right of action
which accrued to the victim at common law because of the tort. The damages re-
coverable are those which the deceased sustained before dying and any damages to
his estate as a consequence of his death. Hansen v. Hayes, 175 Ore. 358, 398-99,
[Vol. 24
Statutory Response to Baker v. Bolton
The statutory right of action for death by wrongful act has been
the order of the day since 1846 when the first wrongful death statute,
the Fatal Accidents Act (Lord Campbells' Act),3 0 was enacted in Eng-
land. The effect of this statute was to ameliorate the harsh conse-
quences of the common law which had allowed recovery of damages for
a personal injury of a slight or nonfatal nature, but denied relief when
the injury proved fatal.3 '
Notwithstanding the statutory remedy, situations still arose where
the plaintiff urged the court to recognize a common law right to an
action for wrongful death. This was due to the limitations cautious
legislatures drafted into the statutes. Frequently a party would be de-
nied recovery under a statute because he was not within the designated
category of beneficiaries32 or his damages were in excess of the maxi-
mum allowable under the statute.3 3 In such cases the plaintiff had no
recourse but to attempt to persuade the court to depart from stare de-
cisis and claim a right to sue at common law for wrongful death. Gau-
dette v. Webb presented this factual situation and, as the subsequent
analysis will show, is the first case involving a nonmaritime fact situa-
tion where the plaintiff has been successful.
Common Law Innovation Through Gaudette v. Webb
Joseph Gaudette died on April 15, 1967, of injuries sustained
when his automobile collided with a truck driven by one of the de-
fendants, Webb. Nearly three years later on March 4, 1970, Gau-
dette's widow posted bond and was appointed administratrix of his
estate. Two days thereafter Mrs. Gaudette, on behalf of herself and
her children, instituted an action for damages for the conscious suffer-
ing and death of her husband. Upon a pre-trial motion by the de-
fendants, the superior court dismissed the suit "on the ground that
154 P.2d 202, 217-18 (1944); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 905-06 (4th ed. 1971).
30. 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93, at 291 (1846).
31. "The thinking mind could not help but recognize that the [common law]
rule presented--'a glaring absurdity in allowing a husband and father, if injured, but
not killed, a right of action for the recovery of the damages thus sustained, and deny-
ing to his widow and children any compensation for the damages inflicted upon them,
should the injury be greater and result in his death."' Rowe v. Richards, 35 S.D. 201,
207, 151 N.W. 1001, 1003 (1915).
32. See, e.g., Clark v. London Gen. Omnibus Co., [1906] 2 K.B. 648; Osborn v.
Gillet, L.R. 8 Ex. 88 (1873). In these cases the plaintiff was not covered under the
statutory remedy embodied in Lord Campbell's Act, and a common law right to a
wrongful death action was advocated by the plaintiff. However, the courts refused to
go beyond the statutory remedy and give relief.
33. See, e.g., Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958); 53 Nw.
U.L. REv. 666 (1958).
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the statute of limitations as to each of [the plaintiff's] actions had ex-
pired before the same were commenced."34
On appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the plain-
tiff refuted the lower court's order of dismissal on the grounds that it
was violative of the statutory provisions which toll the statute of limi-
tations in favor of both administrators35 and minors. 6 Upon con-
sideration of the action for conscious suffering, the court determined
it was error to dismiss the plaintiff's count on the basis that the dam-
ages Gaudette incurred survived his death,37 and as such the action could
be commenced by his administratrix for a two year period subsequent
to the posting of bond s.3  As to the action for wrongful death, the
plaintiff contended that her action was preserved by virtue of the same
provisions which had been employed to protract her action for con-
scious suffering, but the court held that this "provision applie[d] only
to actions which 'the deceased might have brought.' ,,3" As such the
court held that the provision "[did] not apply to wrongful death ac-
tions, which may be brought only 'by the executor or administrator
of the deceased.' "40 Second, the plaintiff argued that the minority
34. - Mass. at -, 384 N.E.2d at 224 citing the Massachusetts' general statute
of limitations. Mass. Stat. 1965, ch. 302, amending MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260,
§ 4 (1959) (now Supp. 1973): "[A]ctions of tort for bodily injuries or for death the
payment of judgement in which is required to be secured by chapter ninety ...
shall be commenced only within two years next after the cause of action accrues."
35. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 10 (1959): "If a person entitled to
bring or liable to any action . . . dies before the expiration of the time hereinbefore
limited, or within thirty days after the expiration of said time, and the cause of action
by law survives, the action may be commenced by the executor or administrator at any
time within which the deceased might have brought the action or within two years after
his giving bond for the discharge of his trust .... "
36. - Mass. at -, 284 N.E.2d at 225. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 7
(1959): "If the person entitled thereto is a minor . . . when the right to bring an
action first accrues, the action may be commenced within the time hereinbefore lim-
ited after the disability is removed."
37. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 228, § 1 (1958): "In addition to the actions
which survive by the common law, the following shall survive: . . . Actions of tort
(a) for assault, battery . . . (b) for consequential damages arising out of injury to
the person .... "
38. - Mass. at -, 284 N.E.2d at 225. Gaudette's administratrix posted bond
on March 4, 1970 and as such the provisions of MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 260,
§ 10 (1959) (see note 35 supra) gave her until March 4, 1972 to bring a timely suit.
39. - Mass. at -, 284 N.E.2d at 225.
40. Id. Mass. Stat. 1965 c.683, § 1, amending, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
229, § 2 (1959) (now Supp. 1973): "A person who (1) by his negligence causes the
death of a person in the exercise of due care, or (2) by wilful, wanton, or reckless act
causes the death of a person under such circumstances that the deceased could have
recovered damages for personal injuries if his death had not resulted . . . shall be
liable in damages . . . . Damages under this section shall be recovered in an action of
tort by the executor or administrator of the deceased."
1074 [Vol. 24
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status of her plaintiff-children tolled the period of limitations until
their disability was removed. 41  The court, in noting that recovery for
wrongful death was purely a statutory creation, stated that "the period
of limitation appearing in our wrongful death statute has been held to
be 'a limitation upon the right as well as upon the remedy, and the
right was lost when . .. [the period of limitation] expired.' "42
Wrongful Death and the Statute of Limitations
The provisions in the wrongful death statutes limiting the time
during which actions can be brought are not so much statutes of limi-
tations as qualifications or conditions essentially restricting the rights
recognized by the statutes.43  A true statute of limitations operates on
the remedy directly and does not extinguish the substantive right.
4 4
As such, the right lives on indefinitely, and only resort to the court
for enforcement of the right is barred by the expiration of the statute
of limitations. In comparison the time provision of a wrongful death
statute is a condition upon which the existence of the right rests.45 If
this time limitation is allowed to elapse, the right is extinguished and
forever gone. Although the result often will be the same under the
two time procedures,46 the difference can be of great significance.
Under the ordinary statute of limitations, certain circumstances
will prolong the period during which resort to the courts can be had
for redress of legal wrongs.47 Nevertheless, under the time provisions
of the death statutes, in the absence of a savings clause, no delay be-
yond the specified period will be allowed even though the rights of in-
nocent parties have yet to attach.48 The plaintiff in Gaudette squarely
41. - Mass. at -, 284 N.E.2d at 225. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 260,
§ 7 (1959).
42. - Mass. at -, 284 N.E.2d at 225-26, citing Bickford v. Furber, 271 Mass.
94, 97, 170 N.E. 796, 798 (1930).
43. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 243 (1921) ;The Harrisburg, 119
U.S. 199, 214 (1886).
44. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 618 (1895); Michigan Ins. Bank v.
Eldred, 130 U.S. 693, 696 (1889).
45. Bickford v. Furber, 271 Mass. 94, 97, 170 N.E. 796, 798 (1930); cf. United
States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U.S. 157, 162 (1914);
Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904). If a plaintiff's ability to resort to courts
in an effort to effectuate his remedy is barred by the statute of limitations, the fact
that his right still exists is of little consequence.
46. In this instance the practical difference between the running of the statute of
limitations and expiration of the time period in wrongful death statutes is primarily
academic.
47. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 270 § 7 (1959) provides for the tolling of the
statute of limitations in favor of persons who are minors, insane or imprisoned.
48. See The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886); Rodman v. Missouri Pac.
Ry., 65 Kan. 645, 650-54, 70 P. 642, 644-45 (1902).
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faced this vital distinction. She attempted to extend the time provi-
sion during which the right to wrongful death recovery existed by ar-
guing for the application of the general statute of limitations designed
solely for protracting remedies.
The Bolt from Tradition
Unable to bring her wrongful death action within the time re-
quired by the statute, the plaintiff implored the court to " 'release itself,
in the interest of justice, from the throngs of mortmain which have
bound for too long a time the law of torts . . . .' "' Her plea was
for the court to break from its "adherence to precedent" and on the
basis of "fairness" allow recovery for the "legal wrongs of the defen-
dants. '" The precedent in the instant case was the decision of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Carey v. Berkshire Rail-
road.5 1 It is significant that this was the first American case to follow
the common law rule established in Baker v. Bolton.12 It had signaled
the acceptance of the English precedent in America which other courts
were alert to follow in their own decisions. 3 Now, under the plain-
tiff's plea, the Massachusetts high court sought to avail itself of grounds
for departing from the doctrine of stare decisis and for overruling Carey
v. Berkshire Railroad.
The court relied primarily upon Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc.54 in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a
cause of action for wrongful death could be maintained under the gen-
eral maritime law. 5 In so holding the Court overruled the long stand-
ing precedent of The Harrisburg,56 which had held that in the absence
of a statute there was no action for wrongful death. The Gaudette court
found the reasoning of Moragne equally applicable to the nonmaritime
law of Massachusetts, and, as such, an examination of the Moragne
decision is necessary for an understanding of Gaudette v. Webb.
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.
Moragne was killed while working aboard the defendant's ship
49. - Mass. at -, 284 N.E.2d at 226.
50. Id.
51. 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475 (1848).
52. 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808); Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death,
17 STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1067 (1965).
53. E.g., Krammer v. San Francisco Market St. R.R., 25 Cal. 434 (1864); Con-
necticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N. H. R.R., 25 Conn. 265 (1856); Shields
v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349 (1854); Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180 (1867); Green v. Hud-
son River R.R., 28 Barb. 9 (N.Y. 1859).
54. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
55. Id. at 409.
56. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
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within the jurisdiction of the state of Florida. His widow brought an
action for damages for wrongful death predicated upon the shipown-
er's negligence and the unseaworthy condition of his vessel.57  The
Federal District Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed this
portion of the complaint, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed5s on the ground that the Florida wrongful death 'statute,59 as
interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court,60 did not encompass un-
seaworthiness as a basis of recovery. Guided by the Supreme Court
case, The Tungus v. Skovgaard,61 the Fifth Circuit held that the peti-
tioner was bound to advance upon the Florida wrongful death statute
which by its very nature precluded her cause of action.62
Heeding the winds of disenchantment 63 which had blown sporad-
ically since The Harrisburg was first decided, the Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Harlan, reversed the court of appeals and held
that The Harrisburg, "somewhat dubious even when rendered, is such
an unjustifiable anomaly in the present maritime law that it should no
longer be followed." '64
Upon an elaborate disposition of the common law cases centering
around Higgins v. Butcher and Baker v. Bolton,"5 the Moragne Court
was able, with the benefit of historical hindsight, to properly overrule
The Harrisburg. The Harrisburg was decided in the aftermath of many
57. An employer of seamen has a duty to maintain his vessel and equipment in
a reasonably safe and suitable condition. This duty is the equivalent of the common
law duty of providing a servant or employee with a safe place to work. The State of
Maryland, 85 F.2d 944, 945-46 (3d Cir. 1936).
58. 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
59. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.01 (1964) (repealed 1972): "Whenever the death
of any person in this state shall be caused by the wrongful act, negligence, careless-
ness or default of any individual or individuals ... (or by the wrongful act, negli-
gence, carelessness, or default of any ship, vessel or boat or persons employed thereon),
and the act, negligence, carelessness or default, is such as would, if the death had- not
ensued, have entitled the party injured thereby to maintain an action (or to proceed in
rem against the said ship, vessel or boat, or in personam against the owners thereof, or
those having control of her) and to recover damages in respect thereof, then ...the
person or persons who ...would have been liable in damages if death had not ensued
shall be liable to an action for damages. . . although the death shall have been caused
under such circumstances as amount in law to a felony."
60. 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1968).
61. 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
62. 409 F.2d 32 (1969).
63. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 158 (1964) (dissenting
opinion); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 597 (1959) (dissenting opinion);
Fall v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 297 F.2d 411, 417 (5th Cir. 1961).
64. 398 U.S. at 378.
65. 398 U.S. at 379-88. The Court discussed the development and criticism as
propounded by legal historians and jurists. See notes 8-25 and accompanying text
supra for a similar analysis.
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federal maritime cases which had set a judicial posture of leniency in
wrongful death actions.6 These cases were based upon the type of
reasoning enunciated by Chief Justice Chase in The Sea Gull:67
There are cases, indeed, in which it has been held that in a suit
at law, no redress can be had by the surviving representative for
injuries occasioned by the death of one through the wrong of an-
other; but these are all common-law cases, and the common law
has its peculiar rules in relation to this subject, traceable to the
feudal system and its forfeitures. . . . [clertainly it better becomes
the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to
give [wrongful death recovery] than to withhold it by established
and inflexible rules. 68
Notwithstanding the fervor of these cases, The Harrisburg was decided
upon the then recent United States Supreme Court case Insurance Co.
v. Brame.69 The Court in The Harrisburg found Brarne decisive for its
quite definitive statement that "no civil action lies for an injury which
results in death. . ."I' Adopting this statement of common law
principle, The Harrisburg Court chose to ignore the opposing cases
and logic in decreeing that "no [wrongful death] action will lie in the
courts of the United States under the general maritime law.17 1
Though recognizing the fallaciousness of the reasoning on which
The Harrisburg rested, the Moragne Court refused to proceed to the
seemingly logical conclusion of overruling the case on the basis of its
vulnerable underpinnings. Instead the Court found "a development
of major significance [had] intervened, making clear that the rule
against recovery for wrongful death is sharply out of keeping with the
policies of modern American maritime law."72  Continuing, the Court
stated that "this development is the wholesale abandonment of the rule
in most areas where it once held sway, quite evidently prompted by the
same sense of the rule's injustice that generated so much criticism of
its original promulgation. '73  This abandonment is manifested by the
quantum and the breadth of the legislation passed in derogation of the
common law rule.
A flood of statutes creating a right of action for wrongful death was
precipitated by Lord Campbell's Act in 1846.7' As the first legislation
66. The Columbia, 27 F. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1886); The Manhasset, 18 F. 918 (E.D.
Va. 1884); The E. B. Ward, Jr., 17 F. 456 (C.C.E.D. La. 1883). For a more ex-
haustive survey of earlier maritime cases involving wrongful death see note 90 infra.
67. 21 F. Cas. 909 (No. 12,578) (C.C. Md. 1865).
68. Id. at 910.
69. 95 U.S. 754 (1877).
70. 119 U.S. at 204, citing 95 U.S. at 756.
71. 119 U.S. at 213.
72. 398 U.S. at 388.
73. Id.
74. 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93, at 291 (1846). Lord Campbell's Act secured a cause
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to create a right to recovery for wrongful death, it has been stated
that this statute was "undoubtedly .. . the product of an enlightened
public conscience that realized the inadequacy of the law to do justice in
this important phase of wrongs to the person . ... 1 The inertia of
Lord Campbell's Act provided the necessary impetus in the United
States for every state to enact a wrongful death statute.76 In addi-
tion to this surge of state legislation, Congress also created such rights
to recovery.
77
The prevalent judicial reaction to this mass of legislation has been
one of strict construction. 7  Viewing the right to recovery for wrong-
ful death as completely statutory, courts decreed that the right gained
its very essence from the terms of the statute.79  For a wrongful act
causing death to be actionable, exact compliance with the provisions of
the statute was deemed necessary. The Supreme Court in The Tun-
gus80 exemplified this reasoning by stating:
It would be an anomaly to hold that a State may create a right
of action for death, but that it may not determine the circum-
stances under which that right exists. The power of a state to
create such a right includes of necessity the power to determine
when recovery shall be permitted and when it shall not.8 '
The result of this judicial approach was to deny a right to recovery to
of action for certain relatives of the deceased in the name of his executor or adminis-
trator if death was caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another in such a
manner that the injured party would have been entitled to an action if death had not
ensued. The beneficiaries were given a right for damages suffered, actionable for
twelve months after the death of the deceased.
75. Soden v. Trenton & Mercer County Traction Corp., 101 NJ.L. 393, 396,
127 A. 558, 559 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925).
76. See Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L.
REv. 402 (1966).
77. National Parks Act, 16 U.S.C. § 457 (1960) (enacted 1928, making state
wrongful death statutes applicable to deaths occurring in an area of exclusive federal
jurisdiction); The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 3, 33
U.S.C. § 903 (1970) (enacted 1927, granting Longshoremen the right to workmen's
compensation for injury or death); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 4, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1333(a)(2) (1964) (enacted 1953, making applicable state wrongful death stat-
utes to certain areas of federal jurisdiction); Federal Employers' Liability Act § 1, 2,
45 U.S.C. §§ 51-52 (1972) (enacted 1908, creating actions for wrongful deaths of
railroad employees); Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958) (enacted 1915); Death on the
High Seas Act § 1, 2, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761, 762 (1958) (enacted 1920).
78. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Werntz, 303 F.2d 612, 614 (7th Cir. 1962); King
v. Cooper Motor Lines, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 405, 407 (D. Md. 1956); Lewis v. Farm
Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 243 N.C. 55, 56, 89 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1955).
79. See, e.g., Williams v. Dowling, 318 F.2d 642, 643 (3d Cir. 1963); Mejia v.
United States, 152 F.2d 686, 687 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 862 (1946);
United States v. Durrance, 101 F.2d 109, 110 (5th Cir. 1939).
80. 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
81. Id. at 594.
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any person whose action did not conform in every manner to the terms
of the death statute.
Moragne and Gaudette
Insisting upon strict adherence to the terms of wrongful death
statutes, the courts closed the door, which had been opened by Lord
Campbell's Act, on any action which fell askew of the statute on which
it rested. In their respective lower courts, the petitioners in both Mo-
ragne and Gaudette were directly confronted with the practical impact
of this stringent judicial scrutiny. In Moragne, the plaintiff, precluded
from use of either the Jones Act 82 or the Death on the High Seas Act,
83
was compelled to seek recovery on the basis of the Florida wrongful
death statute.8 4  However, the plaintiff's claim of unseaworthiness,
though recognized as a federal form of liability,8 5 was not recognized
by the state statute.8 6 Thus, the plaintiff was left without a remedy
despite the fact that she had been legally wronged. Similarly, the
plaintiff in Gaudette faced a trial court which eschewed judicially sup-
plementing the Massachusetts wrongful death statute with any terms
differing from its original form. In rebuffing the plaintiffs attempt to
implement a provision of the general law of torts,8 7 the lower Massa-
chusetts court persisted in articulating the traditional notion that the
right to wrongful death recovery is dependent solely upon the provi-
sions of the wrongful death statute.88
82. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958), by incorporating the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1972), gives the personal representative
of a "seaman" the right to a wrongful death action within three years from the time
the action occurred. The right can be brought for the benefit of the surviving
widow/widower and children, or if none of these exist for the deceased's next of kin.
Since Moragne did not come within the statutory definition of "seaman," the provisions
of the act were not available for use by his personal representative.
83. The Death on the High Seas Act, §§ 1, 2, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761, 762 (1958),
gives the personal representative of any person killed more than one marine league
(approximately three statute miles) from shore by the wrongful act, neglect or default
of another an admiralty action for the benefit of the decedent's wife or husband,
parent, child or dependent relative. Since Moragne was injured while aboard a
docked vessel and thus within one marine league from shore, the act was not available
as a basis of liability for an action by his personal representative.
84. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.01 (1964) (repealed 1972).
85. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). For a discussion of the avail-
ability of state wrongful death statutes in a death action of a nonseaman based upon
the warranty of seaworthiness, see Skovgaard v. The Tungus, 252 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.
1957), aff'd 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
86. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161, 167 (Fla. 1968).
87. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260 § 7 (1959).
88. See - Mass. at -, 284 N.E.2d at 224.
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The Evolution of Nonstatutory Maritime Wrongful Death
Belabored by the real consequences emanating from the policy of
strict application, the Moragne Court addressed itself to the issue inti-
mated by the recognition of the pervasiveness of wrongful death stat-
utes. Originating with Lord Campbell's Act, the public, by means of
legislation, established a policy in favor of recovery for wrongful
death. s9 The magnitude of this public sentiment caused some judicial
response extending the intrinsic importance of the individual statutes.
Manifesting such a response, certain admiralty cases took the initiative
in using the public policy as a rationalization for allowing recovery for
actions which in fact Wvere beyond the dimensions of any wrongful
death statute.90 In reference to these cases Professor Landis noted that
"[jIudges, awake to the purport of this legislative movement, eagerly
seized upon principles derivable from 'natural equity' and 'consonant
. . .with the benign spirit of English and American legislation on the
subject' to mold admiralty law to conform with the trend of civilized
thought."' Contrary to the enlightened trend, the Supreme Court in
The Harrisburg decreed that in the absence of a specific statute, the
courts must adhere to the enshrined English principle of disallowing
recovery for wrongful death.92
The Harrisburg proved to be a formidable opponent to those who
argued the existence of a common law right to recovery for wrongful
death. Citing the doctrine of equity of the statute93 and various prin-
ciples of American land law94 as examples, many authorities recognized
89. See 398 U.S. at 390.
90. The Towanda, 24 F. Cas. 74 (No. 14,109) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1877) (better rule
deemed to be actionable redress for unlawful death); The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909
(No. 12,578) (C.C. Md. 1865) (better and more humane procedure is to allow re-
covery); The Columbia, 27 F. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1886) (those dependent upon deceased
for support have a cause of action against the wrongdoers); The E.B. Ward, Jr., 17
F. 456 (C.C.E.D. La. 1883) (ancient common law rule so modified by state statutes
that an admiralty right for wrongful death can be enforced); Holmes v. 0. & C. Ry.,
5 F. 75 (D. Ore. 1880) (though no common law right to wrongful death, damage re-
covery can be had in admiralty); Hollyday v. The David Reeves, 12 F. Cas. 386
(No. 6,625) (D. Md. 1879) (though contrary to common law, recovery is prefer-
able); The City of Brussels, 5 F. Cas. 761 (No. 2,745) (S.D.N.Y. 1873) (recovery
allowed based on contract of carriage); Cutting v. Seabury, 6 F. Cas. 1083 (No.
3,521) (D. Mass. 1860) ("natural equity" and "general principles of law" are in favor
of recovery); Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894 (No. 11,234) (D. Me. 1825) (com-
mon law doctrine of denying recovery is an opposition to this country's system of
civil polity).
91. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL EssAYs 213, 226
(1934).
92. 119 U.S. at 213.
93. Landis, Statutes and the Source of Law, in HARVAi LEGAL ESSAYS 213,
214-15 (1934).
94. See W. HoLsVWORTH, HIsTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO LAmN Lkw (1927).
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that a concept born by statute could develop a common law status of
its own. From this it was proposed that the total pervasiveness of
statutes had lifted wrongful death to such heights that "to think of
recovery for wrongful causing of death as something exceptional not
to be treated as part of the general law . . . is an anachronism."' 5
As stated by Dean Pound "today we should be thinking of death stat-
utes as part of the general law."96
Congress also joined in criticizing The Harrisburg with legislation
reflective of the change public policy had wrought in the field of wrong-
ful death. The congressional response was embodied in the enactment
of statutes intended to abrogate the glaring voids presently marking
federal wrongful death law.97  Both the Jones Act98 and the Death on
the High Seas Act99 were legislated for the purpose of creating wrongful
death actions for seamen and persons on the high seas who could not
avail themselves of the state wrongful death statutes.
The public fervor favoring redress for death caused by wrongful
acts was also echoed in outcries from the bench.1"' As stated by Jus-
tice Holmes in dissent, "the policy that forbade such [a wrongful
death] action, if it was more profound than the absence of a remedy
when a man's body was hanged and his goods confiscated for the fel-
ony, has been shown not to be the policy of present law by statutes
of the United States and most if not all of the States." 101 Though
the judicial reaction of this period never reached such a critical magni-
tude as to warrant overruling The Harrisburg, many judges reflected the
established public policy by adopting a lenient posture in the accom-
modation of wrongful death actions.10 2  They employed public policy
as a tool to ameliorate some of the harsh facets of the original common
law rule. As a result, a minority of courts took on a stature somewhat
reminiscent of the pre-Harrisburg admiralty cases.'0 3 Armed with the
voice of Congress, these courts sanctioned recovery for wrongful death
95. Pound, Comments on Recent Important Admiralty Cases, 13 NACCA L.J.
(now AM. TRIuAL LAW. J.) 162, 189 (1954).
96. Id.
97. See note 77 supra.
98. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958). See note 82 supra.
99. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761, 762 (1958). See note 83 supra.
100. E.g., The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 602 (1959); Cox v. Roth,
348 U.S. 207, 209-10 (1955); Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 350-51
(1937).
101. Panama R.R. v. Rock, 266 U.S. 209, 216 (1924).
102. E.g., Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 209-10 (1955); Van Beeck v. Sabine
Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1937); Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153, 157-58
(8th Cir. 1961); cf. Giddens v. Isbrandtsen Co., 355 F.2d 125, 126-27 (4th Cir.
1966); Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 346 F.2d 890, 896 (5th Cir. 1965).
103. See note 90 supra.
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whenever an action could be adapted to the provisions of a statute.104
Instigated by congressional enactments, augmented by judicial in-
terpretation and finally consummated by the decision in Moragne, the
evolution of maritime wrongful death became fulfilled. The Court in
Moragne, while explicitly meeting each of the "[v]ery weighty consid-
erations [underlying] the principle that courts should not lightly over-
rule past decisions,"'10 5 overturned The Harrisburg and held that "an ac-
tion does lies under the general maritime law for death caused by vio-
lation of maritime duties."'0 6  Clearly this decision was an effectuation
of the public policy which had urged recognition of recovery for wrong-
ful death as a social norm since the time of Lord Campbell's Act. By
turning its back on this movement, The Harrisburg ultimately proved
to be merely an ephemeral detour from an inevitable conclusion.
Gaudette's Recognition of a Common Law Right
As noted earlier, the petitioners in both Moragne and Gaudette
originally were denied a right to recover for statutory wrongful death
and thereupon urged the court to recognize a common law right for
such an action. The basis on which the Supreme Court granted Mo-
ragne's request proved to the Gaudette court to be most persuasive. 10 7
Considering the logic and authority on which Moragne rested, the Gau-
dette court found plaintiff's petition to be predicated on the same basic
principle.
08
Directing themselves to the pervasiveness of state and federal stat-
utes permitting wrongful death recovery, the Gaudette court cited the
crux of the Moragne decision as illuminating to their case:
These numerous and broadly applicable statutes, taken as a whole,
make it clear that there is no present public policy against allow-
ing recovery for wrongful death. The statutes evidence a wide
104. See note 102 supra.
105. 398 U.S. at 403. The Moragne Court found three principles supportive of
the contention that courts should not depart from stare decisis: (1) the law must
provide a clear standard by which persons can gauge their conduct; (2) relitigation
of every legal issue must be avoided so as to guarantee a fair and expeditious adjudi-
cation; (3) public faith in the judiciary as an instrument of impersonal and reasoned
judgments must be maintained. To overrule The Harrisburg, the Moragne Court felt
it necessary to meet each of the three principles with responsive contravening argu-
ments. As to the first principle the Court found that statutory recovery was the
norm and denial of recovery the exception. Directing themselves to the second
factor the Court found that to replace the widely repudiated Harrisburg rule with a
more just and simple rule would only further judicial efficiency. Thirdly, the Court
felt that disposing of an unjustified rule which produces different results in similar
situations would promote public faith in the judiciary not erode it. Id. at 403-05.
106. Id. at 409.
107. - Mass. at -, 284 N.E.2d at 229.
108. Id.
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rejection by the legislatures of whatever justifications may once
have existed for a general refusal to allow such recovery. This
legislative establishment of policy carries significance beyond the
particular scope of each of the statutes involved. The policy thus
established has become itself a part of our law, to be given its
appropriate weight not only in matters of statutory construction
but also in those of decisional law.10 9
Although Moragne established a rule exclusively for federal maritime
law, the Gaudette court found that decision to be "applicable with
equal force to nonmaritime actions for wrongful death."'110 This in-
corporation of the Moragne decision en toto by the Gaudette court only
came about pursuant to a delineation of the underpinning fundamental
to both cases.
The Moragne Court found the public candor compelling acknowl-
edgement of the right to wrongful death recovery articulated and em-
bodied in wrongful death statutes."' In effect, Moragne depicted a
causal relationship instituted in public policy catalyzed by legislative
enactment and resulting in the promulgation of wrongful death as a
common law right. Nevertheless, as emphasized by the Gaudette
court, the formulation of public policy enunciated in Moragne "was
founded in large part upon the general prevalence of nonmaritime
wrongful death statutes . 1""' Capitalizing on this transitional
point the Gaudette court elaborated the nexus which public policy af-
forded between the two cases.
Clearly the Moragne Court had not relied solely upon federal
legislation, but had resorted to the unanimity of state statutes vouch-
safing a right to recovery for wrongful death as demonstrative of the
public's sentiment. Indisputably, the sheer numerical weight'1 3 of state
statutes made the Court aware of the public's position vis-a-vis wrong-
ful death recovery. Upon consideration of the realities underlying the
public policy in favor of wrongful death actions, the Gaudette court
reasoned a fortiori that the established legislative policy had also sub-
scribed to a right to wrongful death recovery in the land law. 14 If stat-
utes of the land had fostered the inception of a maritime common
law right, these same statutes would require the recognition of a com-
mon law right to wrongful death in nonmaritime actions.
Adopting the plaintiffs pleas for the court to depart from the
harsh common law rule in the "interest of justice," the Gaudette court,
109. Id. at -, 284 N.E.2d at 228-29, citing 398 U.S. at 390.
110. - Mass. at -, 284 N.E.2d at 229.
111. See 398 U.S. at 390.
112. - Mass. at -, 284 N.E.2d at 229.
113. See Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L
REv. 402, 403 (1966).
114. - Mass. at -, 284 N.E.2d at 229.
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in expressly overruling Carey v. Berkshire Railroad,1 5 concluded that
the Massachusetts law had "evolved" so as to recognize a common law
right to wrongful death recovery."16  Once again, as in Moragne, the
legal antecedents were effaced due to judicial cognizance of public pol-
icy.
Controlling Rules of the New Common Law Remedy
The Supreme Court, in deciding Moragne, did not attempt to re-
solve the procedural questions surrounding the new wrongful death ac-
tion under general maritime law. The determination of an applicable
statute of limitations, an appropriate class of beneficiaries, the per-
son(s) having standing to sue, and the measure of damages were mat-
ters whose "final resolution should await further sifting through the
lower courts in future litigation.""11 7  As these issues are resolved they
will become conditions of the new maritime remedy."1
8
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in recognizing a cause
of action for wrongful death under the common law, went one step
further and delineated the controlling rules under the new remedy. In-
stead of merely suggesting that the provisions of the wrongful death
statutes be looked to as "persuasive analogy" for determining who
should be beneficiaries in the case of a wrongful death suit under the
common law, the Massachusetts court expressly referred to the statutes
to answer these procedural questions. It stated that the statutes would
be looked to as:
(a) requiring that damages recoverable for wrongful death be
based upon the degree of the defendant's culpability; (b) pre-
scribing the range of damages recoverable against each defen-
dant; (c) requiring that any action for wrongful death be brought
by a personal representative on behalf of the designated categories
of beneficiaries; and (d) requiring that the action be commenced
within the specified period of time, as a limitation upon the rem-
edy and not upon the right."19
115. 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475 (1848).
116. - Mass. at -, 284 N.E.2d at 229.
117. 398 U.S. at 408.
118. In Futch v. Midland Enterprises, 41 U.S.L.W. 2359 (5th Cir. Jan. 8, 1973),
the federal court was faced with resolving one of these subsidiary issues. The father
of a deceased seaman brought suit for wrongful death under the general maritime law.
The issue for the court was whether or not the plaintiff had standing to sue in the
case. Heeding the suggestion of the Supreme Court in Moragne, the federal circuit
court looked to what Congress had done in connection with wrongful death actions
under the federal statutes. It found uniformity in the statutes-each requiring the
personal legal representative of the decedent to institute the action. "This clear ex-
pression of congressional intent mandates that this Moragne-type action should be gov-
erned by the same rule." Id. Hence, wrongful death actions under the general mari-
time law must be brought by the personal legal representative.
119. - Mass. at -, 284 N.E.2d at 229.
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Conclusion
After the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
in Carey v. Berkshire Railroad,120 other U.S. jurisdictions eagerly fol-
lowed its leadership in denying a common law cause of action for wrong-
ful death. Marking itself as an auspicious milepost in the evolution of
wrongful death, Gaudette v. Webb takes its place as a new landmark
precedent which other jurisdictions are equally free to follow. Should
they be amenable to the Gaudette ruling, and acknowledge the exist-
ence of such a common law right, the option will still be open to en-
large this right beyond the scope of the statutory remedy.
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